‘Getting away with it’:
A Strategic Overview of Domestic Violence
Sexual Assault and ‘Serious’ Incident Analysis

16th March 2004

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1. Caveats

1.1. This analysis is based on incidents reported to the Metropolitan Police Service. However, the lessons learnt are relevant to all those working within the field domestic violence and to the criminal justice system as a whole. This is not an academic document as such, albeit this will be forthcoming in due course.

1.2. The findings can be translated back into meaningful lessons for policing and the criminal justice system. The lessons from 2001 are just as relevant in 2003/04 and should be acted upon accordingly.

1.3. The findings from the analysis contained within this report should be read in conjunction with the ‘Findings from the Multi-Agency Domestic Violence Murder Review’ report. The lessons and recommendations are, to some degree, synonymous. Copies of the ‘Findings from the Multi-Agency Domestic Violence Murder Review’ report can be obtained upon request from the Racial and Violent Crime Task Force, Room 934, Tower Block, New Scotland Yard. Telephone: 0207 230 4374.

1.4. The accuracy of the initial crime report is of paramount importance to the veracity and validity of the contextual analysis. Furthermore, frequent information updates are essential to enable timely and accurate analysis. In some cases, information was not recorded. This was particularly so regarding the information about the context and history of the violence, as well as the progress of the case. This makes it extremely difficult to track attrition rates in particular. In light of this, the number of cases where the offender did receive a sentence could, in all likelihood, be marginally higher¹.

1.5. It was imperative to include case studies to illustrate the profile of some of the offenders. A word of caution: they may cause some distress to the reader. However, this is what the offenders are doing to the victims and it is important to underline and depict their dangerousness and to state that domestic violence is a serious crime. For confidentiality reasons, the information contained within each case study has been heavily sanitised.

¹ It would only be marginally higher due to the negligible conviction rate across the board for domestic violence offenders and sexual assault.
2. Executive Summary

2.1. This analysis presents the MPS and the criminal justice system as a whole with a real opportunity to learn the lessons about these offenders and become more proactive and intelligence-led around prevention, protection and enforcement in the future.

2.2. There are roughly two domestic homicides every month in London. This equates to 25% of all murder in London and 35% in England and Wales. Victims have often been in contact with key agencies prior to their death. The quality of service received may determine whether or not a serious assault becomes a homicide.

2.3. It made intuitive and practical sense to instigate multi-agency domestic violence murder reviews in London to learn about risk factors and the lessons about the positives and negatives of support previously offered to victims. It is clear that one of the major ways to decrease spousal homicide is to identify and intervene when victims are at risk of homicide.

2.4. The behavioural analyst within the Understanding and Responding to Hate Crime team (URHC) analysed data generated by the murder review panels. The analysis undertaken concentrated primarily on identifying risk factors and antecedents to murder, the positives and negative of agency contact and multi-agency working, the modus operandi, weapon use, gender similarities/differences, injuries and crime scene analysis.

2.5. Analysis was undertaken on the multi-agency domestic violence murder reviews, instigated by URHC. To date, 30 murders have been analysed in-depth, although I have had an overview of 56 cases. Please refer to the report ‘Findings from the Multi-Agency Domestic Violence Murder Reviews in London’ produced by Laura Richards and sponsored by Commander Baker.

2.6. Simultaneously, a profile of the most ‘serious’ and sexual domestic violence perpetrators was obtained to inform intervention and prevention tactics. This was achieved by profiling all domestic violence (‘DV’) flagged sexual offences for the first four months of 2001. By profiling the offenders, it is possible to learn lessons about dangerousness, lethality, prevention, protection and enforcement. This fits well within the NIM framework of Intelligence, Prevention and Enforcement.

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2 Domestic homicide is defined as the killing (including murder, manslaughter and infanticide) by one family member of another (including killings by and of children) or by a current or former partner.

3 This figure is based on the average of five financial years: 1996-2001. In 2001-2002 22% of homicides were domestic, whereas 15% were domestic related in 2002-2003. Hence there has been a reduction. It could be speculated that an increased awareness around risk and the domestic violence murder review analysis in the MPS may have been a contributing factor to this reduction, along with other multi-agency crime prevention initiatives.

4 This was a joint project funded by the Home Office Targeted Policing Initiative.
2.7. A control group was also used in order to establish whether the lessons around dangerousness were unique to domestic sexual offenders. Hence, all other ‘serious’ offences against the person were analysed: all ‘DV’-flagged incidents of Actual Bodily Harm (ABH), Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH), kidnappings, attempted murders and murders were analysed for January and February 2001.

2.8. This was the starting point for the development of the MPS Domestic Violence Risk Assessment Model\(^5\) (Appendix I). The findings from this analysis, along with the learning from the multi-agency domestic violence murder reviews, have been fed back into the model.

2.9. The work of the URHC team shows that information can be analysed to target persistent offenders and to prevent repeat victimisation. It has also brought into sharp relief the need to place domestic violence in its context:

- The ongoing relationship between the perpetrators and victim may enhance vulnerability to future abuse and act as a barrier to help-seeking options
- Perpetrators may also be abusing children within the household
- They may have a history of abusing others in a domestic context
- They may go on to abuse others in the future
- They may also be offending outside the home

2.10. By viewing victims of domestic violence as the same as victims from other crimes, it is possible that service providers may inadvertently expose them to increased risks of repeated victimisation and possible support options might be missed. Conversely, by viewing perpetrators of domestic violence as separate from perpetrators of other types of crime, it is possible that crucial intelligence is lost and possible tactics to disrupt the patterns of abuse are overlooked.

2.11. The URHC Domestic Violence Risk Assessment Model has been piloted and the lessons learnt have been incorporated into the revised model. This is the first model of its kind to be compiled from research and analysis, consultation with experts and practitioners, as well as with victims of domestic violence. For this reason it is unique. It is soon to be rolled out across the MPS. The model is also being piloted in West Yorkshire Police and Thames Valley Police as part of an initiative led by the Police Standards Unit at the Home Office.

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\(^5\) Now re-named the MPS DV Risk Assessment Model,
2.12. In total, just under 400 offences and perpetrators have been individually analysed and profiled. Amongst these cases were four homicides. Importantly, the patterns about dangerousness and the profile of the perpetrator were very similar and consistent across the two groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Violence Sexual Assault</th>
<th>Domestic Violence ‘Serious’ Assault</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 in 30 perpetrators are subject to attention from Operation Trident(^6)</td>
<td>1 in 30 perpetrators are subject to the attention of Operation Trident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 in 8 are very high risk and dangerous perpetrators</td>
<td>1 in 7 are very high risk and dangerous perpetrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 in 4 are committing other offences outside the home</td>
<td>7 in 10 are committing other offences outside the home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>At least 49% (119)</strong> of perpetrators had a previous criminal history</td>
<td><strong>At least 70% (102)</strong> of perpetrators had a previous criminal history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Only 29% (69)</strong> of perpetrators were on the National DNA Database (NDNAD)(^7) for other offences either prior to sexual assault or post offence</td>
<td><strong>Only 42% (62)</strong> of perpetrators were on the NDNAD for other offences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.13. The recorded levels of criminality are higher for those committing violent offences as opposed to those committing violent sexual offences. This is not surprising. The conviction rate for rape is very low and has been falling in recent years. The number of persons found guilty of rape in comparison to the total number of offences reported has fallen from 25\% in 1985 to 7\% in 2000\(^8\). Much of this is due to the change in the nature of the cases coming to trial, with many more instances of domestic or acquaintance rape being reported than before. These cases, which often rely on one person's word against that of another, make the decision of juries, if they get that far, much harder than in cases of stranger rape. Hence very few offenders get convicted.

2.14. In parallel to this, just under half of the domestic violence sexual perpetrators could not be traced/tracked as they had given false identification. This may say more about criminality, in the sense that they have learnt how to slip through the criminal justice system because they have been through it previously. Officers should ensure they get corroborating identification and record details accurately.

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\(^6\) Jamaican nationals involved in organised crime.

\(^7\) The NDNA database hold DNA profiles from those individuals suspected, cautioned and convicted of recordable offences, as well as those derived from unsolved crimes. ACPO guidelines recommend that in the first instance, samples should be taken from persons arrested for: offences against the person, sexual offences and domestic burglary offences.
2.15. Furthermore, there are a significant amount of domestic violence perpetrators who are involved in other forms of criminality, particularly young offenders. At one end of the continuum, they are involved in drug dealing, supplying and addiction, as well as burglary and robbery. However, some perpetrators are also committing sexual assault and/or are involved in murder outside the home.

2.16. A comprehensive, integrated and intelligence-led approach is required when dealing with domestic violence perpetrators. Police must become more proactive when dealing with domestic violence offenders. Domestic violence offenders should be on the agenda at Police Tasking meetings as a matter of course. This must be National Intelligence Model (NIM) compliant.

2.17. Offenders are not systematically being forensically swabbed on arrest/charge. This will impact on the effectiveness of the National DNA database, one of the most powerful tools at police disposal. DNA should be taken from offenders on arrest/charge. Supervisors must ensure this happens.

2.18. Given that at least 1 in 8 perpetrators is committing sexual and serious offences outside the home, the offenders warrant further analysis and should be looked at on a national level in order to ‘make the links’. However, domestic violence sexual assault appears to be routinely screened: 27% (66) of offences met the criteria for inclusion on the Serious Crime Analysis (SCAS) database housed at the National Crime and Operations Faculty. However, they were not flagged by the Sexual Offences Section in the Metropolitan Police for inclusion on the database, leading to severe information and intelligence gaps when trying to link offences and offenders.

2.19. The analysis shows that domestic violence is serious crime. The evidence base depicts that offenders at this level are serial offenders. Officers need to think intelligently and laterally about these offenders and in doing so become more proactive in their approach. If they assault inside the home, they could be doing it outside the home. Men who rape are good candidates for sexual violence for both significant women and anonymous women.

2.20. Officers dealing with domestic violence offenders must start to learn the lessons about who they are dealing with, particularly given that 80% of crime is committed by 20% of offenders\(^\text{10}\) (80:20 rule originated from Pareto’s principle). The more contact the

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\(^9\) Set up as a recommendation by Lord Byford following the Yorkshire Ripper Inquiry to analyse cross-border serious crime nationally. Offences for inclusion are: rape, murder and abduction and all discretionary offences.

\(^10\) Systems for Intelligence and Detection (SID) team, Criminal Intelligence Branch, New Scotland Yard, 1996.
perpetrators have with police and the criminal justice system, the more sophisticated they become in their offending behaviour and getting away with it.

2.21. In terms of re-offending, nearly a third (46) of the ‘serious’ perpetrators had committed offences since the reported offence in January and February 2001. Many are serial offenders, who go from one abusive relationship to the next, are violent to significant women and other people in their lives. For example, two perpetrators had already killed their first wives.

2.22. Once a violent man leaves the partner, it does not mean the violence ends. Evidence suggests that many find new partners to abuse. This is why they need to be risk assessed and managed. Information about specific abusers needs to be shared amongst professionals.

2.23. The attacks experienced by victims of domestic sexual assault tend to result in more serious injury than other types of allegations made within domestic incidents. Hence, domestic-related sexual assault is a good indicator of repeat victimisation, risk of harm and potential lethal violence.

2.24. The location of the assault can prove crucial, but this location itself does not mitigate the harm of rape. On the contrary, the very location of the rape and the relationship between the offender and victim in fact leads to more harm.

2.25. Victims of domestic violence sexual assault should be treated as repeat victims. Many have been abused previously but have not reported it to the police. Police should be asking questions about the history of the abuse and should develop systems and processes for monitoring repeat victimisation.

2.26. If victims are systematically raped and abused, the chances of homicide are higher. This is not just with regards to the perpetrator lethally harming the victim, but also the victim may mentally ‘snap’ and kill the violent partner. Sexual assault is flagged as one of the six high risk factors (SPECSS).

2.27. Given that the sample analysed was just under 400, only two perpetrators had been referred to a Multi-Agency Public Protection Panel11 (MAPPP). Therefore domestic violence perpetrators are not routinely being risk-assessed or risk-managed. This is a very dangerous practice and must be addressed at the earliest opportunity.

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11 In April 2001, the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act placed a statutory duty on police and probation to establish inter-agency protocols for the management of the risk posed by sexual and violent offenders. Multi-agency Public Protection Panels were formed in every London borough to monitor and share information on the most dangerous offenders.
2.28. The analysis highlights that child protection issues tend to be missed by police. Police officers do not always ask if children live at the home address or complete Form 78s. Furthermore, at least 10% of children are actually witnessing the sexual assault. Many of the assaults are happening as a result of disputes over separation and child contact/custody. Separation (child contact) is flagged as one of the six high risk factors (SPECSS).

2.29. The long-term impact of children witnessing and experiencing such crimes is not being considered or addressed by some statutory agencies. The proportion of incidents where children actually witnessed the sexual assault should underline the harm not just to the individual woman but to the children as well.

2.30. More needs to be done to ‘make the links’ particularly between Community Safety Units (CSU), Child Protection Units (CPU), Youth Offending Teams (YOTS), Public Protection Units (PPU) and Rape teams (Sapphire).

2.31. The argument for the requirement of a risk assessment process is based on the need to enhance victim safety, manage lethal situations, to make better use of intelligence and to increase the standard of the investigation and supervision. The model is about prevention rather than prediction. It ensures that a risk management plan aimed at specific risk variables is put into place. When properly applied risk assessment can serve as a paradigm for effective case management to domestic violence.

2.32. All officers, frontline and CSU officers in particular, should be educated regarding the six high risk factors: SPECSS
- Separation (child contact)
- Pregnancy
- Escalation
- Cultural issues and isolation,
- Stalking
- Sexual assault

This should be mainstreamed into frontline policing (Appendix II). Risk management in the form of RARA, Remove, Avoid, Reduce, or Accept the risk must then be employed.
2.31. **Perpetrators should be systematically risk-assessed and risk-managed.** The MPS Domestic Violence Risk Assessment Model should be used in medium and high-risk cases with consideration being given to standard-level cases of domestic violence. This process would ensure that this occurs in a consistent, standardised, open and transparent way. It also ensures more timely and accurate identification of risk. In addition to the six high-risk factors questions, should be asked about the context of the violence, for example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The history</th>
<th>Contact orders</th>
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<tr>
<td>Children present at the home address</td>
<td>Suicidal or homicidal ideation/intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to kill</td>
<td>Social isolation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons used</td>
<td>Animal abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jealousy and controlling behaviour</td>
<td>Minimisation/denial of the offence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol/drug abuse</td>
<td>Whether the offender is involved in other criminal activity</td>
</tr>
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</table>

2.32. Intervention plans need to relate to the risk situation drawing upon information from all agencies involved (Appendix III). The nature and severity of the risks posed and the factors that may trigger further offending (stopping medication, drug/alcohol abuse, loss of job, separation, for example) are important in determining which risk management options are appropriate.

2.33. Given the huge number of cases involved, officers should **start with a gold/premium standard of intervention when dealing with the most serious offences (the volume of serious cases is relatively low**\(^{12}\)) and once systems are in place, it should be mainstreamed across to all domestic violence related offences.

2.34. **Part of the core business of a Multi-Agency Domestic Violence Forum could be to conduct regular inter-agency reviews of victims identified as being at ‘serious’ risk.** This could take the form of a monthly MAPPP meeting, whereby agencies know the names of victims and offenders to be discussed to ensure research prior to attendance. Information shared should be shared under ‘serious risk to life’. A series of solutions should be sought according to the needs of the victim.

2.35. Cases that are not as ‘serious’ should be discussed at the Domestic Violence Action Group Forum or similar/most appropriate Forum. The victim’s consent should be obtained. If it is not obtained, then cases should be discussed anonymously and general advice given. This

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\(^{12}\) Refer to the domestic violence sexual and serious incident analysis: 2 in 5 are high risk and dangerous offenders from a sample of just under 300 perpetrators across the MPD (first two months of 2001).
could be an effective way of dealing with lower-level chronic offending in a multi-agency environment.

2.36. Awareness needs to be raised about the difference between arranged and forced marriages. Education also needs to be increased about ‘honour killings’ as well as the barriers and cultural issues involved when some victims from ethnic minority groups report domestic violence to police. Police should be culturally refined when dealing with victims, but racially and ethnically blind when dealing with perpetrators.

2.37. Supervising officers must ensure that the investigating officer inputs as much information as possible about the identity of the offender, as well as the details of the incident, on police databases.

2.38. Only 2% (6) of the perpetrators received a sentence. This is likely to be marginally higher, given that the outcome of the case tends not to be recorded on the crime report. Nevertheless, this figure still demonstrates that the conviction rate is negligible. This reflects the national picture, 11% conviction rate as cited in the HMIC/CPSI Domestic Violence Thematic report published on February 19th 2004.

2.39. Perpetrators must be held accountable for their actions. The responsibility of whether a case is proceeded with to court should not solely rest on the victim, particularly if the victim is vulnerable. The State should take some of this responsibility for holding offenders accountable for their actions. If perpetrators have committed a criminal offence they should be dealt with accordingly.

2.40. Twelve offenders had either just been released from prison or had broken a court order, injunction or bail conditions by going round to the victim’s home and committing the offence. Pre-release risk assessments must be conducted by Police and Probation. Furthermore, magistrates and the judiciary must be informed of risk assessments undertaken when considering bail applications. Bail conditions are not sufficient or appropriate for some of the dangerous offenders who are determined to commit further offences. A remand in custody should be sought, supplying the magistrate with the full case history to enable them to make an informed decision.

2.41. In total, only 24 offenders had previously received a sentence for domestic violence: 8% (12) of the ‘serious’ and 5% (12) of the sexual offenders. Given the negligible conviction rate for domestic violence, a ‘stand alone register’ for domestic violence perpetrators that have been convicted would not work. This point is also underscored by the findings from the murder review; only two offenders had received a previous sentence for domestic violence.
2.42. One way of monitoring high-risk perpetrators is to risk-assess and risk-manage them through MAPPA. Given that all those coming to the attention of Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) would be entered onto the Violent and Sexual Offenders (VISOR) database\(^\text{13}\), this seems to be the most appropriate and suitable form of ‘register’ for chronic and dangerous domestic violence offenders.

2.43. The URHC project has demonstrated the wide reaching uses of frontline information to aid understanding of what victims tell service providers about their experiences of domestic violence. When this material is set beside data held by these agencies on the behaviour of perpetrators, it generates a comprehensive picture of the nature and extent of abuse in terms of risk, threat and dangerousness.

2.44. The demand placed on key service providers by domestic violence cases (one contact every six minutes within the MPS alone) means that it is important to find ways to respond appropriately to the different typologies of cases, nature of need and levels of risk. A joined-up, victim-oriented, intelligence-led approach to policing, which holds the perpetrator accountable for their actions, can make a very specific contribution to the safety of victims of domestic violence.

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\(^{13}\) This will be a national system for recording and storing data in a standardised way to improve procedures for managing offenders. The database will also be used to assist police in investigating crime and targeting specific offenders.
3. Introduction

3.1. The MPS receives just over 104,000 calls each year, comprising one in twenty of all notifiable offences. The Community Safety Unit (CSU) officers handle over 9,000 incidents of hate crime every month, of which domestic violence allegations constitute the substantial majority. Domestic assaults account for a notable proportion of violent crime:

- one third of all Common Assaults
- over a quarter of Actual Bodily Harm (ABH)
- one eighth of Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH)
- two fifths of allegations of domestic abuse that come to the attention of the MPS relate to offences of violence
- one in nine cases concern allegations of criminal damage
- one in twelve relate to public order
- one in twenty to allegations of theft.

3.2. The British Crime Survey shows that domestic violence is also more likely to involve repeat victimisation than any other ‘criminalised’ behaviours. Additionally, domestic violence is more likely to result in injury than other offences against the person. Whilst there are some one-off incidents of domestic violence, invariably by the time the victim contacts the police, they have been exposed to a repeated pattern of abuse. This is particularly true where the offences are more serious. Analysis of MPS data also appears to confirm assumptions regarding escalation in frequency and severity of incidents over time. Early intervention can help prevent escalation where patterns are not yet established. Furthermore, structured intervention can also help disrupt established patterns.

3.3. One of the most significant facts about rape is that throughout London and the UK reporting of rape has increased year on year for almost three decades, whilst the number of convictions have remained almost constant. The conviction rates for England, Wales and Scotland are now at their lowest point for 30 years. At the same time, reporting continues to rise, with a 20% increase in 2002 alone.

3.4. Investigative, procedural and legal frameworks however are still implicitly based on notions of rape as being committed by strangers. However, we know that the majority – both reported and unreported – of rapes are committed by known men, with current and ex-partners particularly highly represented and these are the same men who sexually assault women in a stranger context.

3.5. It is highly important not to lose sight of the severity of some of the allegations. Two women are murdered every week in England and Wales at the hands of partners or ex-partners. Domestic

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homicide accounts for over 25% of all homicides in London. Hence a high proportion of murders are domestic violence related. Victims have often been in contact with key agencies for assistance prior to their death. The speed and/or quality of service providers' responses to abused individual's emergency requests may have a direct bearing on whether or not a serious assault becomes a homicide.

3.6. Research suggests certain characteristics could be more predictive of homicide than others. As physical violence is the most frequent precursor of spousal homicide, it makes intuitive as well as practical sense to ground any instrument around characteristics related to the abuse experienced.

3.7. Following the Human Rights Act 1998 assessing the risks posed to victims and children vulnerable to abuse has assumed even greater significance. In order to effectively deploy resources to meet the police service's obligations under the Act to protect victims and children in the household, an accurate risk assessment must be made. Given the nature of the volume of domestic violence incidents, how then do police respond to their caseload? Given the concerning level of vulnerability of particular individuals, can strategies be formed and implemented to prioritise the most serious cases, identify and target repeat victimisation and escalating violence? Yes, they can and the report goes on to detail the strategies and models that are being recommended.

3.8. In order to gain a profile of the most 'serious' and dangerous perpetrators to inform intervention and prevention tactics, all 'DV' flagged sexual offences have been analysed for the first four months of 2001. Additionally, a control sample was used to establish whether the patterns emerging were unique to sex offenders alone. All offences relating to domestic Actual Bodily Harm (ABH), Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH), kidnappings, attempted murders and murders were analysed for January and February 2001. This is in terms of interrogating crime reports, intelligence and information reports, information held by the Police National Computer (PNC) and the Forensic Science Service (FSS).

3.9. This is the first time nationally and internationally that domestic violence perpetrators have been analysed in this way. Previously only the convicted offenders have been analysed. Traditionally researchers and analysts have never had access to the police data to look at offenders from an intelligence-led perspective. These are the perpetrators who tend to 'get away' with perpetrating domestic abuse against their (ex) partners and others.

3.10. Furthermore, the analysis depicts that the more contact the perpetrators have with police and the criminal justice system, the better they get at offending and getting away with it. Many
important lessons have been learnt about criminogenic factors of domestic violence offenders from studying them in this way.

3.11. **In total just under 400 offences and perpetrators** have been individually analysed and profiled. Amongst these cases were four homicides. However, a further 30 murder reviews have also been analysed in-depth. The findings have been detailed below under the following headings: Perpetrators, Victims, Attrition, Forensics and Case Studies. Case studies relating to both the sexual and ‘serious’ offences have been included to depict the context of the findings and to demonstrate just how dangerous some of the perpetrators are. *These cases are not anomalies.* They are consistent with the rest of the findings when analysing domestic violence sexual and ‘serious’ perpetrators.

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15 In particular Article 2: Right to life, Article 3: Prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Article 6: Right to a fair hearing and Article 8: Right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence.
4. Emerging findings from the Domestic Violence Sexual Violence Analysis

In total, 252 reported sexual offences were analysed. Eleven of those were believed to be either malicious allegations (six), bigamy offences (four) and one offence did not fall into the catchment period. All eleven were excluded from further analysis. Hence 241 offences were analysed in-depth.

4.1. Perpetrators (n=241)

4.1.1. 36% (86) of perpetrators used a weapon: over half of these involved fists (47); knife (18); gun (4). The other cases involved a: meat cleaver; baseball bat; scissors; teeth; glass; screwdriver; brick; fork; heavy object; telephone cord; tracksuit and pillow when committing the sexual assault.

4.1.2. Domestic sexual assault tends to result in more serious injury than other types of allegations made within domestic incidents. Hence, domestic-related sexual assault is a good indicator of repeat victimisation, risk of harm and potential lethal violence. The perpetrators are using the weapon to physically injure the victim rather than for compliance. This is more clearly depicted in the six-month data analysis correlating injury description and allegation code (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Domestic incident allegations by victim injury description (Jan-June 2001)
4.1.3. If victims are systematically raped and abused, the risk of homicide increases. This is not just with regards to the perpetrator lethally harming the victim, but also the victim may kill the violent partner.

4.1.4. In more than 1 in 20 (13) cases, the perpetrator was recorded as suffering from mental health issues. In 15% of cases (35) the perpetrators had taken drugs and/or alcohol.

4.1.5. 2 in 5 (92) perpetrators were flagged as high-risk in terms of re-offending and exhibit particularly disturbing behaviour when committing the assault either in terms of the sexual acts performed, language used, level of violence, and/or a weapon being used.

4.1.6. At least 49% (119 of) perpetrators had a previous conviction. This tended to be for offences other than domestic violence. Furthermore, 44 perpetrators could not be traced further on the systems due to giving bogus names and a lack of identifiers (date of birth, correct name, for example). Hence the number of perpetrators with a criminal record is assumed to be higher given the inaccuracy of recording the correct date of birth and names of perpetrators.

4.1.7. Roughly 1 in 12 (20) perpetrators had previous convictions or were believed, through intelligence, to be involved in other rapes/sexual assault. 1 in 30 (7) perpetrators were known to Operation Trident (Jamaican nationals involved in organised crime), and 1 in 100 (3) offenders were suspects in other murder inquiries. Hence 1 in 8 are very high risk and dangerous offenders.

4.1.8. 5% (12) of offenders had either just been released from prison, or had broken a court order, injunction or bail conditions by going round to the victim’s home and committing the offence.

4.1.9. CRIMINTS\textsuperscript{16} were created in 40% (97/241) of cases. However, for high-risk perpetrators less than half (44/92) had CRIMINTS completed. This clearly demonstrates the difficulties officers have trying to identify risk given that Intelligence Logs are not created for the most dangerous perpetrators coming into contact with the MPS. This must happen to be NIM compliant and pick up offenders in other investigations.

4.1.10. 1 in 4 are prolific offenders involved in other forms of crime. 26% (63) of perpetrators had five or more CRIMINTS for domestic violence and involvement in other criminal activity.

\textsuperscript{16} Criminal Intelligence logs
27% (66) of offences met the criteria for inclusion on the Serious Crime Analysis (SCAS) database housed at the National Crime and Operations Faculty, Bramshill. However, they were not flagged by the Sexual Offences Section in the Metropolitan Police for further local and cross border analysis in London. Hence a large number of offences and perpetrators have been missed resulting in significant gaps in information and intelligence. This is of particular importance given the link between known and stranger sexual violence.
4.2. **Victims (n=241)**

4.2.1. In more than half the cases (130), the victims had reported DV allegations to police previously; in a further 7% (38) of cases the victim stated that they had been abused before but *not* reported it to the police. There was no information as to whether the victim was a repeat victim in 19% (46) cases. Yet again these proportions are likely to be higher if the right questions are asked and recorded accurately by officers.

4.2.2. In only 15% (36) of cases the reporting officer recorded that there was no previous history of domestic abuse. Again total confidence cannot be assumed with this figure given the inaccuracy of flagging and recording of repeat victims.

4.2.3. In 90% (217) of cases, the perpetrator either currently is or has been the victim's partner; in half of these cases (116/217) the couple were *already separated or separating* at the time of the sexual offence. **Hence separation heightens the risk of a further serious assault and escalation.**

4.2.4. In 9% (23) of cases, the victim and perpetrator were not partners at any time (family or babysitter, for example). In one case there was *no* information recorded about the nature of the relationship between the two parties. Therefore, domestic violence sexual assault reported to the police primarily involves intimate partners or those that have previously been intimate. However, it is not exclusively or exhaustively an intimate partner issue by any means.

4.2.5. 5% (11) of victims were recorded as being pregnant at the time of the sexual assault.

4.2.6. **In 31% (74) of offences, children were recorded as being present in the household; in 10% (25) cases, they actually witnessed the rape. In 9% (24) of cases the victim was a child.** In 12% (29) of cases there was no information about children being present at the time of offence or in the household. These proportions would be greater if the right questions were asked and the information was recorded accurately in each case.

4.2.7. Four cases involved an arranged marriage; one other case was a forced marriage.

4.2.8. Roughly 1 in 12 (20) victims were recorded as having mental health issues, including self-harm. Some, not all, of the victims were already receiving support.
4.3. Attrition

4.3.1. Of the allegations classified as *bona fide*, 86 (36%) victims wished to pursue the allegation.

4.3.2. Of the 36% wishing to pursue:

- There was no further update recorded for 54 offences in terms of progress of the case or outcome of the trial\(^\text{17}\).
- 2 % (6) of perpetrators received sentence\(^\text{18}\).
- Six offenders received a First Instance Harassment Warning.
- In one case the perpetrator was found not guilty at court.
- The CPS discontinued 8% (19) of cases citing insufficient evidence in some cases and no reason given in others.

4.3.3. Just under three quarters (64%) did not want to pursue the allegation. Where the victims in the case withdrew, numerous reasons were given as to why they did not wish to proceed:

- Concern about the distress and upset it would cause the children
- Fear of retaliation and reprisal from the abuser
- Fear that they would not be believed
- Fear of the legal system and court process itself
- Victim has been sexually assaulted before and did not want to go through ‘horrible’ court ordeal again
- Not wanting to give evidence
- Too distressing and in too fragile a state of mind to give evidence
- Not wanting to anger the abuser further when he came out of prison
- Not wanting the abuser’s wife/girlfriend and children to find out about affair
- Feared repercussion between the two families
- Wanting to reconcile the relationship.

4.3.4. However, importantly all of the victims wanted the incident recorded for future reference. They were keen for the matter to be recorded in case they were repeat victims in the future and wanted to pursue it at another time.

\(^\text{17}\) At the time of analysis, four Investigating Officer’s stated they were awaiting the victim to contact them, one investigation was ongoing, one victim tried to withdraw but CPS said they would serve a witness summons (the offence was too serious not to be pursued), five still awaited CPS advice, one case stated there were no new lines of enquiry and the officer could not locate the suspect. In the remaining 42 cases there was no further update on the crime reports in terms of progress of the trial or the outcome.

\(^\text{18}\) In one case, the rape was dismissed but offender received two months for ABH and twelve months for indecent assault. In three offences reported in February the maximum sentence was nine months for an ABH, For the offences reported in April, one offender received five years and another received nine years for rape, three years for intimidating a witness and twelve months for ABH to run concurrently.
4.4. **Forensics**

4.4.1. 29% (69) of perpetrators were on the National DNA Database (NDNAD) for other offences either prior to or post sexual assault; [13 of those profiles were taken for other offences committed. Only six in January were profiled for the actual sexual assault committed on their partner/ex-partner].

4.4.2. 9% (21) of perpetrators could not be traced due to little identifying information when submitting searches to the FSS laboratory.

4.4.3. 50% (120) of perpetrators were not on the NDNA database. If the perpetrator is stating that consensual sexual intercourse has taken place, most officers tend to see it as a ‘consent issue’ and do not take intimate samples. A vast number of officers think that DNA is only necessary if they are trying to prove that sexual intercourse took place and identify unknown offenders. They do not tend to think that offenders could also be committing other offences. Therefore opportunities for identifying other offences they may have previously committed, as well as future offences, are missed.

4.4.4. 2% (5) of profiles matched with other offences nationally: three for burglary, one for theft of a motor vehicle and one for theft of a motor vehicle and possession of drugs. This would no doubt be higher of all offenders were swabbed on arrest/charge.
5. **Emerging Findings from Domestic Violence ‘Serious’ Assault Analysis**

All offences that constitute ‘serious’ domestic violence allegations were analysed for the months of January and February 2001. This includes: Actual Bodily Harm (ABH), Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH), kidnappings, attempted murders and murders. This is in terms of crime reports, intelligence and information reports, information on the PNC and held by the FSS. A total of 144 offences and 147 perpetrators were analysed. One offence was wrongly flagged and hence discounted from further analysis. **In total, 143 offences and 146 perpetrators were analysed in depth.**

Four offences were also risk-assessed by the officers at the time of the offence as being ‘non-critical’. However, they resulted in the victim being murdered. Lessons have been learnt from these cases through this analysis and the murder reviews have been analysed in-depth and presented to the Strategic Murder Review Group.

5.1. **Perpetrators (n=146)**

5.1.1. **77% (112) of perpetrators used a weapon:** fists (41), knife (44), scaffold bar (2), gun (2) and 49 used an object of some description, for example, a hammer, piece of wood, glass or iron, boiling water, boiling oil, wooden stool, mug, fork, broom handle and razor. **The weapons were actually used physically on the victim rather than as a means of gaining compliance.**

5.1.2. **One in two (73) of perpetrators were flagged as high-risk and dangerous offenders.**

This was in terms of re-offending and exhibiting particularly disturbing behaviour when committing the assault either in terms of the language used, level of violence used and/or a weapon being used.

5.1.3. **17 situations have been flagged as extremely volatile and could result in severe escalation.**

This is in terms of the behaviour of the victim, the perpetrator and the context of the violence.

5.1.4. **Roughly one in twelve (11) perpetrators had previous convictions or are believed, through intelligence, to be involved in other rapes/sexual assault; four perpetrators were known to Operation Trident; two perpetrators had killed their previous partner. One in eight are very high risk and dangerous perpetrators.**

5.1.5. **At least 70% (102) of perpetrators had a previous criminal history.** Again this was not predominantly for offences of domestic violence, but for other criminal offences. 22 perpetrators could not be traced further on the system due to giving false identification as well as inaccuracy of recording of the information. **Hence the number of perpetrators with a criminal record is assumed to be higher.**
5.1.6. 23% (33) of offences involved alcohol and drugs. Seven perpetrators were recorded as having mental health issues. Two perpetrators were also recorded as being illegal immigrants.

5.1.7. Roughly one in four (35) of the suspects was female. In eight cases the violence appeared to be defensive and in retaliation to a threat or to violence from the male partner/ex-partner. One case was a murder where there was previous history of DV with the male as the suspect and the female as the victim.

5.1.8. Just over half of the incidents (78) had CRIMINTs completed detailing the incident.

5.1.9. 42 out of 73 high-risk perpetrators had CRIMINTs completed for the offences. This clearly demonstrates the difficulties regarding risk assessment, given that Intelligence logs are not being created for the most dangerous perpetrators coming into contact with the MPS.

5.1.10. Just over half (75) of the perpetrators had five or more CRIMINTS for domestic violence and involvement in other criminal activity. Hence some perpetrators are also prolific and serial offenders. They are also involved in other forms of crime.

5.1.11. In terms of recidivism, at least a third (46) of perpetrators had re-offended since the reported offence in January and February 2001. In some cases this was on the same partner, in others it was a new partner. Once a violent abuser leaves the partner, it does not mean the violence ends. Evidence suggests that many find new partners to abuse. This is why they need to be risk-assessed and managed. Information about specific abusers needs to be shared amongst professionals.

5.1.12. Two were on licence at the time of the domestic violence offences following a prison sentence for the murder of their previous partners.

5.1.13. Four cases later resulted in the victim being murdered by the suspect. Only two out of the four murders had a CRIMINT completed. These cases were included within the murder review analysis.

5.1.14. Only 8% of perpetrators (12) had previously received a sentence for domestic violence.

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19 In two cases there were too many CRIMINT entries and not enough identifying information to establish which ones related to the named perpetrator. Two perpetrators’ names were not disclosed by the victim at the time of reporting. One perpetrator was not searched due to the fact he killed himself after committing the offence. However, he had killed his first wife and had an extensive criminal background.

20 Previous sentences served: 100hrs community sentence; one month custodial sentence; 15 years for murder of ex-partner; nine years for ABH and rape of ex-partner; four years for GBH of ex-partner. In two cases, the sentences were not recorded.
5.1.15 perpetrators were in breach of bail conditions or injunctions when committing the offence.

5.1.16.13 perpetrators have repeatedly been given bail when the violence is escalating and they are becoming more prolific.

5.1.17.17 perpetrators were particularly prolific and dangerous in the types of offences they were (and are still) committing. By looking at the number of intelligence records created for the offenders, it is possible to see how 'criminally active' they are. The records are all for different types of offences. They range from shoplifting, drugs, offensive weapons to racially aggravated assaults, sexual assault and murder. These perpetrators are not anomalies. For example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominal</th>
<th>Number of CRIMINTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator 1 (juvenile)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator 2 (Operation Trident)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator 3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator 4 (Operation Trident)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator 5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator 6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator 7</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator 8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator 9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator 10</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator 11</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator 12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator 13</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.18. However, out of all the perpetrators analysed, only two perpetrators had been referred to MAPPPs. Therefore even the most dangerous are not currently being routinely risk assessed and risk managed.

5.2. Victims (n=143)

5.2.1. In 42% (60) of cases the victim had reported DV allegations to police previously; in a further 21 cases the victim stated that they had been abused before but had not reported the abuse to police. Hence 57% (81) were repeat victims and there was a long and protracted history of abuse. There was no information recorded as to whether the victim was a repeat in 26 cases. In 14 cases it was stated by the investigating officer that it was the first reported incident to police and that there was no previous history. Therefore, these
proportions are likely to be higher if the right questions are asked and recorded accurately by officers.

5.2.2. In 67% (96) of cases the victim either currently is or has been the perpetrator’s partner; in just under half (47) of these cases, the couple were already separated or separating at the time of the offence. **Separation does heighten the risk of escalation and the chance of a further serious assault is then increased.**

5.2.3. In 20% (29) of cases the victim and perpetrator were family members. In three cases the assault was committed by the ex-partner on the victim’s new partner. In 18 cases the relationship was not recorded.

5.2.4. Domestic violence serious assault reported to the police primarily involves (ex) intimate partners. However, it is not exclusively or exhaustively an (ex) intimate partner issue by any means.

5.2.5. In 23% (34) of offences children were recorded as being present in the household; in 14% (21) cases of they actually witnessed the assault. In seven cases it was only recorded on the intelligence report rather than the crime report as well that children were residing in the household. In 14% (20) of cases there was no information recorded about children being present at the time of the offence or in the household. These proportions would be greater if the right questions had been asked and the information was recorded accurately in each case.

5.2.6. In *almost all* of the offences, physical injuries were sustained by the victims and varied in terms of the degree of injury and medical treatment: 106 victims required stitches, seven victims were strangled (one resulting in a murder), three victims were stabbed to death, 33 victims had extensive bruising and in 33 cases the physical abuse resulted in a broken bone. One victim had a punctured lung, one received serious burns, one required re-constructive surgery of her vagina, one required a plate in her jaw, in two cases the injuries were not recorded and three victims received no injuries.

5.2.7. Seven victims were pregnant at the time of the assault.

5.2.8. Six victims were recorded as suffering from mental health issues.
5.3. Attrition

5.3.1. Just over half of the victims (74) wanted to continue with a prosecution. Four offences were homicides and, therefore, the Crown is pursuing the cases as opposed to the victim.

5.3.2. Of the 76 wishing to pursue the allegation:
- There was no further update recorded on the crime report in 60 cases
- The CPS discontinued seven cases citing insufficient evidence
- Five offenders were cautioned by police
- Three offenders committed one murder so there were three separate charges. However, only the female partner was found guilty of murder and given a life sentence
- For another murder, the offender received a life sentence
- Three offenders were found guilty of murder and received a life sentence

5.3.3. 44% (64) of victims withdrew their allegation as they were unwilling to pursue\(^ {21} \), citing similar reasons as the sexual assault victims. However, although just under half of the victims did not want to prosecute the perpetrator, importantly all of the victims wanted the incident recorded for future reference. They were keen for the matter to be recorded in case they were repeat victims in the future and wanted to pursue allegations at another time.

5.4. Forensics

5.4.1. Only 42% (62) of these dangerous, prolific and serial perpetrators’ DNA profiles are currently held on the NDNA database.

6. Case Studies

A number of case studies have been used to illustrate the type of domestic violence sexual and serious assault that is routinely being reported to police [Appendix IV and Appendix V]. The intelligence and information that can be accessed by officers during their investigation seeks to demonstrate exactly how dangerous some of these perpetrators are. The main point being, that if an intelligence-led perpetrator profile is not compiled, how can officers properly investigate the crime and the CPS make an informed decision about charge without the full facts? Moreover, how can they make the links between other offences the perpetrator may be committing if these crucial parts of the jigsaw are missing?

\(^{21}\) Two perpetrators were not identified by the victim and hence were not proceeded with and one perpetrator killed himself after attempting to kill his partner and hence was not proceeded with.
7. Recommendations
What lessons can be learnt from analysing and profiling domestic violence sexual and serious assaults in 2001? How can this be translated back into meaningful lessons for policing and the criminal justice system in the 21st century?

Recommendation 1

| Domestic violence sexual and serious offenders must be included on local and national police intelligence systems such as SCAS and ViSOR. They should also be on the agenda at police tasking meetings. NIM compliance is crucial. |

Recommendation 2

| DNA should be taken from offenders on arrest/charge. If awaiting CPS advice, DNA should still be taken in every case. Supervisors must ensure this happens. |

Recommendation 3

| Officers should not be solely reliant on PNC details when it comes to whether the offender’s DNA profile is on the NDNAD. It can be misleading regarding whether it has been taken, confirmed or on the database. If in doubt, the officer should call the FSS to confirm the results in person. |

Recommendation 4

| More needs to be done to ‘make the links’ particularly between Community Safety Units (CSU), Child Protection Units (CPU), Youth Offending Teams (YOTS), Public Protection Units (PPU) and Rape teams (Sapphire). |

Recommendation 5

| Many are serial offenders, who go from one abusive relationship to the next, are violent to other significant women in their lives and other people. Two perpetrators had killed their first wives. Once a violent man leaves the partner, it does not mean the violence ends. Evidence suggests that many find new partners to abuse. This is why they need to be risk-assessed and managed. Information about specific abusers needs to be shared amongst professionals. |
Recommendation 6

All officers (frontline and CSU officers in particular) should be educated regarding the six high risk factors: **SPECSS** Separation, Pregnancy, Escalation, Cultural Issues and sensitivity, Stalking, Sexual Assault should be mainstreamed into frontline policing. Risk management in the form of **RARA**: Remove, Avoid, Reduce, Accept must then be employed.

Recommendation 7

It is recommended that any report of domestic violence sexual assault be regarded as an incident of serial domestic abuse requiring a thorough investigation and development of a support package. Police should be asking questions about the history of the abuse and should develop systems and processes for monitoring repeat victimisation.

Recommendation 8

It is vital that questions are asked about children residing in the home address given the link between domestic violence and child abuse. Form 78s must be completed when children are found to be present at the home address. There should be better links between the Community Safety Unit (CSU) and Child Protection Units (CPU) to ensure that children are being protected.
Recommendation 9

Police officers must ask female victims more consistently about whether they are pregnant or have recently given birth.

Recommendation 10

Offenders should be systematically risk-assessed and risk-managed. The MPS Domestic Violence Risk Assessment Model should be used in medium-risk cases with consideration being given to standard-level cases of domestic violence. For example, questions should be asked about: the history of abuse, separation, pregnancy/new birth, escalation, cultural issues and isolation, sexual assault, stalking, children residing at the home address, threats to kill, weapons used, alcohol/drug abuse, whether the offender is involved in other criminal activity, contact orders and so forth.

Recommendation 11

Officers must ensure effective safety planning is undertaken when victims are separating from their partner. Risk of further harm is increased at this point.

Recommendation 12

Given the huge number of cases involved, officers should start with a gold/premium standard of intervention when dealing with the most serious offences (the volume of serious cases is relatively low) and once systems are in place, it should be mainstreamed across to all domestic violence related offences.

Recommendation 13

Cases that are considered to be less serious should be discussed at the Domestic Violence Action Group Forum or similar/most appropriate Forum. The victim’s consent should be obtained. If it is not obtained, then cases should be discussed anonymously and general advice given. This could be an effective way of dealing with lower-level chronic offending in a multi-agency environment.
Recommendation 14

High-risk domestic violence offenders should be captured on the Violent and Sexual Offenders (ViSOR) database. This would be more appropriate than a ‘stand alone’ register. All those coming to the attention of MAPPPs would be entered onto the ViSOR database.

Recommendation 15

Police must become more proactive when dealing with domestic violence offenders. Domestic violence offenders should be on the agenda at Tasking meetings as a matter of course. This must be National Intelligence Model (NIM) compliant.

Recommendation 16

Awareness needs to be raised about the difference between arranged and forced marriages. Awareness also needs to be increased about honour related violence and ‘honour killings’ and the barriers and costs involved to some victims from minority groups reporting domestic violence to police.

Recommendation 17

Officers should obtain corroborating evidence regarding identification of the offender and input the information on the relevant database.

Recommendation 18

Supervising officers must ensure that the investigating officer records accurate information about the incident and offenders on police databases. A supervisor’s job is to supervise that this gets done.
Recommendation 19

Perpetrators must be held accountable for their actions. The responsibility of whether a case is proceeded with to court should not solely rest on the victim, particularly if the victim is vulnerable. The State should take some of this responsibility for holding offenders accountable for their actions. If perpetrators have committed a criminal offence they should be dealt with accordingly.

Recommendation 20

Officers should submit the full case history in order to inform decision-making and risk assessment. The CPS, magistrates and judiciary must be informed of risk assessments undertaken when considering bail applications. On occasions, bail conditions are not stringent enough to deter some offenders who are persistent offenders. A remand in custody should be sought, supplying the magistrate with the full case history to enable them to make an informed decision.

Recommendation 21

Judges and magistrates should be required to attend appropriate targeted multi-agency training so they get exposure to the issues and complexities surrounding domestic violence. They should be ticketed if they fail to attend.

Recommendation 22

Risk assessment should occur whether offenders are prosecuted or not.

Recommendation 23

There should always be pre-release risk assessment reviews in domestic violence cases between Probation, Police and Prisons when offenders serve a custodial sentence. The prisoner should always be contacted to undertake this prior to release.
9. Conclusion

Only a small amount of sexual and domestic violence offenders receive sentence at court. The conviction rate is negligible. The problem lies with the criminal justice system itself. This needs to be remedied at the earliest opportunity, along with establishing effective programmes for offenders. There is no merit in finding other solutions to fix this problem, such as restorative justice for these types of sensitive offences. The problems and inefficiencies of the criminal justice system need to be tackled head on. The Domestic Violence, Crimes and Victims Bill, the Sexual Offences Act (if it receives Royal Assent) and the development of the Green Paper ‘Every Child Matters’ should go some way to improve this. The emphasis must be on better victim care and protection, as well as holding perpetrators accountable for their actions.

Given the negligible conviction rate for domestic violence and sexual violence, a ‘stand alone’ register for domestic violence offenders that have been convicted would not work. All domestic violence offenders should be risk-assessed and managed. The high-risk offenders should be managed by MAPPPs. Intervention plans need to relate to the risk situation drawing upon information from all agencies involved. The nature and severity of the risks posed and the factors that may trigger further offending (stopping medication, drug/alcohol abuse, loss of job, separation, for example.) are important in determining which risk management options are appropriate.

This analysis has demonstrated the wide-reaching uses of frontline information to aid understanding of what victims tell service providers about their experiences of domestic violence. When this material is set beside data held by these agencies and the behaviour of perpetrators, it generates a comprehensive picture of the nature and extent of abuse in terms of risk, threat and dangerousness. This work shows that information can be analysed to target persistent offenders and to prevent repeat victimisation and chronic offending. It has also brought into sharp relief the need to place domestic violence in its context:

- The ongoing relationship between the perpetrators and victim may enhance vulnerability to future abuse and act as a barrier to help-seeking options
- Perpetrators may also be abusing children within the household
- They may have a history of abusing others in a domestic context
- They may also be offending outside the home
By viewing victims of domestic violence as the same as victims from other crimes, it is possible that service providers may inadvertently expose them to increased risks of repeated victimisation and possible support options might be missed. Conversely, by viewing perpetrators of domestic violence as separate from perpetrators of other types of crime, it is possible that crucial intelligence is lost and possible tactics to disrupt the patterns of abuse are overlooked.

The demand placed on key service providers by domestic violence cases (one contact every six minutes within the MPS alone) means that it is important to find ways to respond appropriately to the different typologies of cases, nature of need and levels of risk. A joined-up, victim-oriented, intelligence-led approach to policing, which holds the perpetrator accountable for their actions, can make a very specific contribution to the safety of victims of domestic violence.

The analysis of domestic violence sexual and serious perpetrators and the multi-agency murder reviews has informed the development of the Risk Assessment Model, in terms of identifying certain patterns and characteristics that could indicate potential lethality. The analysis also depicts that it is possible to identify people, locations or situations associated with an exceptionally high risk of serious violence and to target these individuals in terms of preventative interventions. This significant part of the process has been previously lacking and domestic violence must be seen as serious crime. Risk assessment is part of the larger process of effective case management.

Whilst marital rape has been a criminal offence since the early 1990s, few organisations have developed an expertise in either enabling disclosure or providing appropriate support. This gap is all the more significant given the evidence that sexual violence is an indicator of repetition and seriousness, and that women who kill their abusers have invariably been subjected to repeat sexual victimisation.

The Government have stated that ‘Public protection, particularly of children and the most vulnerable, is a priority. Crime and the fear of crime has a damaging and dehabilitating effect on all who experience it’22. The analyses have also informed the wider debate currently about domestic violence and sexual offences by providing evidence of the type of offences, victims and perpetrators who are regularly contacting or coming into contact with the police. In the vast majority of cases, they are also the cases that routinely fall out of the criminal justice system.

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22 Protecting the Public: Strengthening protection against sex offenders and reforming the law on sexual offences, published in 2002
These findings and recommendations have been fed back into the Diversity Directorate for implementation at the earliest opportunity. The analyses has also informed the ‘Sentencing Review Panel on Rape’ in 2001, as well as the response to the Government regarding ‘Protecting the Public: Strengthening Protection Against Sex Offenders and Reforming the Law on Sexual Offences’, published in 2002, the Safety and Justice consultation paper published in June 2003, and the Restorative Justice consultation paper published in July 2003.
10. Appendices

Appendix I: MPS Risk Assessment Model

Appendix II: High Risk Factors

Appendix III: Tactical Menu of Intervention Options for Domestic Violence Victims and Offenders

Appendix IV: Domestic Violence Sexual Assault Case Studies

Appendix V: Domestic Violence Serious Assault Case Studies

Appendix VI: Glossary of Terms